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INTRODUCTION
Five years ago, Dr. Bakul Patel, the current Senior Director of
Global Digital Health Strategy and Regulatory Affairs for Google
Health, recruited “13 engineers—software developers, AI experts,
cloud computing whizzes”—to prepare for “a future in which health
care is increasingly mediated by machines.”1 At that time, artificial
intelligence (AI) technologies were on their way to revolutionize drug
development, medical diagnostics, and health care delivery—not only
in the private sector,2 but also at the federal Food and Drug
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1. Megan Molteni, Medicine Is Going Digital. The FDA Is Racing to Catch Up, WIRED
(May 22, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/medicine-going-digital-fda-racing-catch [https://perma.cc/
V2LE-UY4Z]. Dr. Batel joined Google in 2022, after working 13 years at the FDA. See Casey
Ross, Google Taps FDA’s Former Digital Health Chief for Global Strategy Role, STATNEWS (May
16, 2022), https://www.statnews.com/2022/05/16/bakul-patel-google-global-strategy-role [https://perma.cc/
UR6C-VHME].
2. See No Longer Science Fiction, AI and Robotics Are Transforming Healthcare, PWC
(Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/healthcare/publications/ai-robotics-newhealth/transforming-healthcare.html [https://perma.cc/BFR8-YNQR] (describing advances in AI
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Administration (FDA), which is in fact where Dr. Patel spearheaded
this recruitment effort in 2017 as Director of the FDA’s Digital Health
Division.3
Tucked away in a chapter titled “Regulatory Analysis at the Food
and Drug Administration” of a voluminous 2020 report commissioned
by the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS),
“Government by Algorithm: Artificial Intelligence in Federal
Administrative Agencies” (2020 Government by Algorithm Report),
one of us showcased how the “FDA is in the vanguard among agencies
in its experimentation with advanced AI techniques, including ‘deep
learning,’” and predicted that “[i]n the FDA’s case, uptake of AI/ML
tools may herald a broader shift away from premarket approval and
toward postmarket surveillance efforts.”4
Professor Mason Marks takes up both of these threads in
“Automating FDA Regulation.”5 First, Marks describes rich case
studies of FDA modeling and simulation to demonstrate that AI tools
are changing the landscape of FDA regulatory decisionmaking.6
Second, Marks insightfully probes how “the role of AI as a medical
product regulator” has accelerated the shift of the FDA’s focus away
from premarket clearance of medical devices and drugs toward
postmarket surveillance and review.7
We wholeheartedly agree with Marks that the FDA is at the
forefront of an AI revolution in health safety. We likewise agree that
the FDA is in the midst of a regulatory paradigm shift—one further
propelled by the influx of AI technologies. Marks probes this shift with
increasing alarm, warning of subpar safety and efficacy standards,
eroding public trust in the FDA, and threats to the agency’s
transparency, accountability, objectivity, and legitimacy.8 Whereas

for healthcare); Laura Lorenzetti, Here’s How IBM Watson Health Is Transforming the Health
Care Industry, FORTUNE (Apr. 5, 2016), https://fortune.com/longform/ibm-watson-healthbusiness-strategy [https://perma.cc/ZWJ4-S7LF] (describing IBM Watson’s attempts at applying
AI to medical diagnostics).
3. Molteni, supra note 1; Bakul Patel: Experience, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/
in/bakul-patel/details/experience [https://perma.cc/FLG9-VVMM], (last visited Nov. 13, 2022).
4. Catherine M. Sharkey, Regulatory Analysis at the Food and Drug Administration, in
GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES 53, 54, 56 (Feb. 2020) [hereinafter Sharkey, Regulatory Analysis at the FDA].
5. Mason Marks, Automating FDA Regulation, 71 DUKE L.J. 1207 (2022).
6. See id. at 1219–45 (describing how the agency is “building an algorithmic FDA” through
the use of “molecular models,” “virtual humans and patient-specific models,” and “simulated
clinical trials”).
7. Id. at 1207.
8. Id. at 1246–62, 1272–76.
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Marks maintains a steadfast drumbeat of the perils of this shift, we
draw attention to its promise. We highlight the transformative
potential in terms of enhancing public health and safety. The FDA, by
sustaining its investments in AI regulatory capabilities, could leverage
AI to accelerate and broaden access to drugs and medical devices while
preserving its “gold standard” of medical safety.
In Part I, we elaborate on the scope of the FDA’s
experimentation, which extends beyond the fascinating (albeit limited)
case studies of FDA molecular modeling and clinical trial simulation
presented by Marks. In particular, we highlight novel pilot projects in
which the FDA used Natural Language Processing (NLP) to analyze
data collected through its Adverse Event Reporting System for
postmarket surveillance of drugs.9
In Part II, we describe the paradigm shift in resources and efforts
at the FDA from stringent ex ante premarket approval to more
dynamic and rigorous postmarket surveillance. Whereas Marks places
exclusive emphasis on the potential perils from this shift, we fill out the
picture by pointing to the potential promise of an AI-enabled
postmarket surveillance regime.
In Part III, we explore the FDA’s track record in building internal
AI capacity and show how the agency’s bold experimentation with the
collection of structured “fit-for-purpose” data (as distinguished from
unstructured text-based adverse event reports)10 illustrates its
transformation into an “information agency” of the twenty-first
century.11 Given that for most federal agencies the question is not
whether the agency will eventually embrace AI technologies, but how

9. See infra notes 36–41 and accompanying text (surveying NLP pilots that FDA has built
on top of its Adverse Reporting System); Questions and Answers on FDA’s Adverse Event
Reporting System (FAERS), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. [hereinafter Q&A on FAERS],
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/surveillance/questions-and-answers-fdas-adverse-event-reporting-systemfaers [https://perma.cc/EF69-9V3Q], (last updated June 4, 2018) (providing an introduction to the
FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS) database, which includes adverse reports
submitted for drugs and therapeutic biological products).
10. Unstructured data is data that is not organized in a pre-defined manner (often taking
the form of unstructured text collected from free-form text inputs), as distinguished from
structured data, which is data stored in a standardized format with a well-defined structure. See
IBM Cloud Education, Structured vs. Unstructured Data: What’s the Difference, IBM (June 29,
2021), https://www.ibm.com/cloud/blog/structured-vs-unstructured-data [https://perma.cc/3EHDTRLU].
11. See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: The FDA’s
Dual Role as Safety and Health Information Regulator, 68 DEPAUL L. REV. 343 (2019) (arguing
that the FDA has developed dual roles as “safety regulator” and “health information regulator”).
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and in which domains,12 the FDA’s experience provides a window into
the future promise of AI in the administrative state.
I. THE FDA AT THE FOREFRONT OF AN AI REVOLUTION IN PUBLIC
HEALTH AND SAFETY
The FDA is in the vanguard among federal agencies in its
experimentation with advanced AI techniques, including “deep
learning.”13 The FDA oversees products that represent over $3 trillion
in annual consumption, or about 20 percent of household spending in
the United States.14 This vast regulatory scope means that even limited
use of AI tools by the FDA has a substantial potential impact on
human welfare. The AI revolution is affecting the FDA’s regulatory
operations in two ways. First, the FDA regulates medical devices that
increasingly incorporate AI technologies. Second, the FDA leverages
AI for its own internal uses. We explore each in turn.
A. Regulating AI Devices
AI medical devices are revolutionizing the practice of medicine.
AI pattern recognition powers these devices to recognize certain types

12. See Ben Gansky, Michael Martin & Ganesh Sitaraman, Artificial Intelligence Is Too
Important To Leave to Google and Facebook Alone, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2019), https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/11/10/opinion/artificial-intelligence-facebook-google.html [https://perma.cc/86AD-CHPE]
(arguing that a “public option for artificial intelligence” would enable federal agencies to develop
AI capacity, notably in the health care sector). The FDA is charting a path toward such a “public
option for artificial intelligence.” Id.
13. See generally DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE USE
CASES INVENTORY (2022), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hhs-ai-use-cases-inventory.pdf
[https://perma.cc/286K-U5HJ] (listing AI pilots at the FDA to search tobacco authorization
applications, de-duplicate and extract clinical features from drug adverse event reports, and mine
social media data to monitor opioid usage); Di Zhang, Jaejoon Song, Sai Dharmarajan, Tae Hyun
Jung, Hana Lee, Yong Ma, Rongmei Zhang & Mark Levenson, The Use of Machine Learning in
Regulatory Drug Safety Evaluation, STATS. BIOPHARM. RSCH. (2022) (describing the FDA’s use
of machine learning and “real-world data” to regulate drug safety); Zhaoyi Chen, Xiong Liu,
William Hogan, Elizabeth Shenkman & Jiang Bian, Applications of Artificial Intelligence in Drug
Development Using Real-World Data, 26 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 1256 (2021) (describing the
FDA’s efforts at promoting the use of “real-world data” and surveying resulting studies that have
leveraged real-world data and AI, including deep learning); Pratik Shah, Francis Kendall, Sean
Khozin, Ryan Goosen, Jianying Hu, Jason Laramie, Michael Ringel & Nicholas Schork, Artificial
Intelligence and Machine Learning in Clinical Development: A Translational Perspective, 69 NPJ
DIGIT. MED. 2, 4 (2019) (describing a partnership between the FDA and the MIT Media Lab to
“engender AI and ML research for computational medicine and clinical development and [an]
accompanying regulatory framework to improve health outcomes for patients”).
14. See Fiscal Year 2023: Justification of Estimates for Appropriation Committees, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. 2 (2022).
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of injuries,15 diagnose medical conditions,16 increase the quality of
medical imaging technology,17 or predict future adverse medical
events.18 Such AI-powered devices increasingly outperform
conventional medical devices in the hands of specialized doctors.19
The FDA has granted approval to a first generation of AI medical
devices.20 Utilizing the agency’s de novo review process—an

15. See, e.g., FDA Permits Marketing of Clinical Decision Support Software for Alerting
Providers of a Potential Stroke in Patients, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 13, 2018)
[hereinafter Viz.AI Approval], https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/
ucm596575.htm [https://perma.cc/BN8G-GDZE] (“The Viz.AI Contact application is a
computer-aided triage software that uses an artificial intelligence algorithm to analyze images for
indicators associated with a stroke.”); FDA Permits Marketing of Artificial Intelligence Algorithm
for Aiding Providers in Detecting Wrist Fractures, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 24, 2018)
[hereinafter OsteoDetect Approval], https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/
ucm608833.htm [https://perma.cc/E4N2-SG7N] (“The OsteoDetect software is a computer-aided
detection and diagnostic software that uses an artificial intelligence algorithm to analyze twodimensional X-ray images for signs of distal radius fracture, a common type of wrist fracture.”).
16. See, e.g., FDA Permits Marketing of Artificial Intelligence-Based Device to Detect Certain
Diabetes-Related Eye Problems, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 11, 2018) [hereinafter IDxDR Approval], https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm604357.htm
[https://perma.cc/8HAG-KHKC] (“IDx-DR[] is a software program that uses an artificial
intelligence algorithm to analyze images of the eye taken with a retinal camera called the Topcon
NW400.”).
17. See, e.g., Aquilion Precision, CANON, https://us.medical.canon/products/computedtomography/aquilion-precision [https://perma.cc/UK97-UJ5B] (noting Canon’s “Aquilion
Precision” Ultra High Resolution CT Scanner provides more than twice the resolution of previous
CT systems).
18. See, e.g., Georgios Christopoulos, Jonathan Graff-Radford, Camden L. Lopez, Xiaoxi
Yao, Zachi I. Attia, Alejandro A. Rabinstein, Ronald C. Petersen, David S. Knopman, Michelle
M. Mielke, Walter Kremers, Prashanthi Vemuri, Konstantinos C. Siontis, Paul A. Friedman &
Peter A. Noseworthy, Artificial Intelligence–Electrocardiography to Predict Incident Atrial
Fibrillation, 13 CIRCULATION: ARRHYTHMIA AND ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 1420 (2020); Nozomi
Niimi, Yasuyuki Shiraishi, Mitsuaki Sawano, Nobuhiro Ikemura, Taku Inohara, Ikuko Ueda,
Keiichi Fukuda & Shun Kohsaka, Machine Learning Models for Prediction of Adverse Events
After Percutaneous Coronary Intervention, 12 NATURE: SCI. REPS. 1 (2022).
19. See, e.g., Xiaoxuan Liu, Livia Faes, Aditya U. Kale, Siegfried K. Wagner, Dun Jack Fu,
Alice Bruynseels, Thushika Mahendiran, Gabriella Moraes, Mohith Shamdas, Christoph Kern,
Joseph R. Ledsam, Martin K. Schmid, Konstantinos Balaskas, Eric J. Topol, Lucas M. Bachmann,
Pearse A. Keane & Alastair K. Denniston, A Comparison of Deep Learning Performance Against
Health-Care Professionals in Detecting Diseases from Medical Imaging: A Systematic Review and
Meta-Analysis, 1 LANCET DIGIT. HEALTH 271, 272, 291–93 (2019) (finding that deep learning
algorithms using medical imaging provide equivalent diagnostic accuracy at increased diagnostic
speed); Ravi Aggarwal, Viknesh Sounderajah, Guy Martin, Daniel S. W. Ting, Alan
Karthikesalingam, Dominic King, Hutan Ashrafian & Ara Darzi, Diagnostic Accuracy of Deep
Learning in Medical Imaging: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 65 NPJ DIGIT. MED. 1, 19–
20 (2022) (finding that “[deep learning] currently has a high diagnostic accuracy”); see also Nan
Wu et al., Deep Neural Networks Improve Radiologists’ Performance in Breast Cancer Screening,
39 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MED. IMAGING 1184, 1184–94 (2020).
20. As of September 2020, the FDA had approved sixty-four AI-based medical products.
See Stan Benjamens, Pranavsingh Dhunnoo & Bertalan Meskó, The State of Artificial Intelligence-
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alternative approval pathway for “novel devices of low to moderate
risk”21—the FDA gave marketing clearance to Viz.AI (detects
strokes), OsteoDetect (recognizes bone fractures), and IDx-DR
(identifies diabetic retinopathy) after their respective manufacturers
demonstrated certain performance criteria.22 With regard to these first
AI medical device approvals, the FDA sought to “creat[e] a regulatory
framework for [clinical decision support] products that encourages
developers to create, adapt, and expand the functionalities of their
software to aid providers in diagnosing and treating diseases and
conditions.”23
The next generation of AI medical devices will present additional
regulatory challenges. Thus far, the FDA has only approved “locked”
devices, i.e., devices that do not independently adapt to new data they
observe, but rely, instead, on manufacturer updates. But, the FDA has
recognized that “there’s a great deal of promise beyond locked
algorithms that’s ripe for application in the health care space.”24
Enabling AI models to dynamically update through time promises to
unlock better performance and more personalized health care

Based FDA-Approved Medical Devices and Algorithms: An Online Database, 3 NPJ DIGIT. MED.
1, 2 (2020).
21. This approval pathway provides authorization to “be marketed and used as predicates
for future 510(k) submissions.” Evaluation of Automatic Class III Designation (De Novo)
Summaries, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/about-fda/cdrh-transparency/
evaluation-automatic-class-iii-designation-de-novo-summaries [https://perma.cc/PW3T-ZJ8X], (last
updated Oct. 17, 2022).
The vast majority of medical devices enter the market via the FDA’s 501(k) process, a
streamlined “premarket notification” approval (PMN) pathway that imposes less stringent
requirements than the FDA’s Premarket Approval (PMA) process. It mirrors the streamlined
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) regulatory approval pathway for generic drugs. See
Sharkey, Regulatory Analysis at the FDA, supra note 4, at 54.
22. See, e.g., Viz.AI Approval, supra note 15 (“The company submitted a retrospective study
of 300 CT images that assessed the independent performance of the image analysis
algorithm . . . against the performance of two trained neuro-radiologists for the detection of large
vessel blockages in the brain.”); OsteoDetect Approval, supra note 15 (explaining that
OsteoDetect was approved based on “a retrospective study of 1,000 radiograph images that
assessed the independent performance of the image analysis algorithm for detecting wrist
fractures and the accuracy of the fracture localization of OsteoDetect against the performance of
three board certified orthopedic hand surgeons”); IDx-DR Approval, supra note 16 (reporting
that the FDA found that “IDx-DR was able to correctly identify the presence of more than mild
diabetic retinopathy 87.4 percent of the time and . . . identify . . . patients who did not have more
than mild diabetic retinopathy 89.5 percent of the time”).
23. Viz.AI Approval, supra note 15.
24. Conor Hale, FDA Lays Out Plans for a New Review Framework for AI and Machine
Learning-based Devices, FIERCE BIOTECH (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.fiercebiotech.com/
medtech/fda-lays-out-plans-for-a-new-review-framework-for-ai-and-machine-learning-baseddevices [https://perma.cc/7XL9-869M].

92

DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[Vol. 72:86

delivery.25 Anticipating approval of “dynamic AI” devices, the FDA,
in January 2021, issued its “Software as a Medical Device Action Plan”
(SaMD Plan) guidance, which outlines a “Predetermined Change
Control Plan” process through which manufactures can get preapproval for certain types of dynamic updates.26 Critically, the FDA’s
SaMD Plan emphasizes the need for any dynamic AI medical device to
be monitored “from its premarket development through postmarket
performance.”27
B. Internal AI Use
We turn now from the FDA’s regulation of AI-powered medical
devices for use in society to our main focus (as well as Marks’): the
FDA’s internal use of AI in its regulatory drug and medical device
approval processes. Marks draws attention to the FDA’s
experimentation with uses of AI in molecular modeling (to
preemptively identify potentially harmful drug substances), virtual
humans and patient-specific models, and simulated clinical trials (to
reduce the cost of in vivo clinical trials and accelerate drug

25. See, e.g., Mihaela van der Schaar, Ahmed M. Alaa, Andres Floto, Alexander Gimson,
Stefan Scholtes, Angela Wood, Eoin McKinney, Daniel Jarrett, Pietro Lio & Ari Ercole, How
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Can Help Healthcare Systems Respond to COVID19, 110 MACH. LEARNING 1, 4 (2020) (explaining how machine learning models can “learn”
through time how an individual’s features can be “mapped into personalized predictions of risk”);
Chris Giordano, Meghan Brennan, Basma Mohamed, Parisa Rashidi, François Modave & Patrick
Tighe, Accessing Artificial Intelligence for Clinical Decision-Making, 4 FRONTIERS DIGIT.
HEALTH 1, 4–5 (2021) (stating that clinical decisionmaking tools using “dynamic and
personalized” AI models can improve patient outcomes); Fei Wang & Anita Preininger, AI in
Health: State of the Art, Challenges, and Future Directions, 28 YEARBOOK MEDICAL
INFORMATICS 16, 23 (2019) (explaining that combining state-of-the-art “dynamic AI” and
“federated learning” techniques—which enables the training of personalized AI models without
accessing sensitive patient data—can allow AI medical devices to continuously improve their
performance based on troves of data collected by wearable or mobile devices).
Moreover, “locked” algorithms “can lead the AI/ML system to use a poor estimate of
the true relationship between the inputs and outputs and thereby possibly cause harm to patients
(for example, through misdiagnosis).” Boris Babic, Sara Gerke, Theodoros Evgeniou & I. Glenn
Cohen, Algorithms on Regulatory Lockdown in Medicine, 366 SCI. 1202, 1202–03 (2019).
26. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING (AI/ML)-BASED SOFTWARE AS A
MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD) ACTION PLAN, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 3 (Jan. 2021)
[hereinafter SAMD PLAN], https://www.fda.gov/media/145022/download [https://perma.cc/4ZSYAB2S] (describing the “Predetermined Change Control Plan” as including an SaMD PreSpecifications (SPS) component describing “what” model aspects the manufacturer intends to
change through learning and an Algorithm Change Protocol (ACP) component explaining “how”
the algorithm will learn and change while remaining safe and effective).
27. Id. at 1.
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development).28 We have our quibbles with the conclusions Marks
draws from his rich case studies. But, our greater concern is that by
focusing solely on these specific use cases, Marks omits key ways in
which the FDA leverages AI to more effectively operate in an
increasingly complex and high-stakes regulatory environment, thus
failing to acknowledge benefits the FDA is receiving through the use
of AI in its regular activities.
To begin, we are skeptical of the main conclusion Marks draws
from his case studies. Take his primary motivating example: the FDA’s
use of the Public Health Assessment via Structural Evaluation
(PHASE) computational methodology in a potential regulatory
decision to schedule and ban kratom.29 Marks puts forth the
PHASE/kratom saga to support his overarching thesis that the FDA is
recklessly substituting algorithms for human judgment based on
reliable evidence. Marks argues that PHASE is a “poor substitute for
the eight-factor analysis”—the traditional means by which the FDA
evaluates unknown substance risk, taking into account “complex
historical, epidemiological, and psychological factors” in addition to
purely chemical and physical properties.30 While this is undoubtedly
correct (especially given that PHASE is not designed for processing
sociological and demographic data), PHASE may nonetheless serve as
a “signaling” tool, incorporated into a hybrid human-machine review
process that would likely be more accurate and reliable than the
traditional eight-factor analysis.31
Moreover, as Marks details, in this specific case, the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) overrode the FDA and asked

28. See Marks, supra note 5, at 1227–36, 1238–45 (outlining the current and potential roles
of molecular models, virtual humans and patient-specific models, and simulated clinical trials in
FDA regulation and policymaking).
29. See id. at 1227–36 (discussing how PHASE, a computational methodology adopted by
the FDA, was used to assess risk to public health and its shortcomings). PHASE was an internally
built model, later supplemented with Clarity, a third-party software, i.e., “proprietary technology
developed by a private drug company”—i.e., one of the companies the FDA regulates. Id. at 1275.
But, this type of conflict of interest is not endemic to all (or even most) forms of FDA
experimentation with AI. Id.
30. Id. at 1231.
31. For example, PHASE can be useful in quickly identifying those substances that require
further examination by the FDA because of their similarities to other harmful substances. In other
words, the FDA could employ molecular modeling at the outset of unknown or understudied
substance analysis to generate a framework through which to complete a more comprehensive,
albeit streamlined analysis. The AI system would thereby guide the FDA in best utilizing its
expertise and not to make a broader policy decision.
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the Drug Enforcement Administration not to schedule the drug.32
Could this be evidence that an existing internal oversight mechanism
was deployed to recognize and correct for model deficiencies and lack
of evidentiary support? Marks does not pause to consider this (and we
thus do not have enough information to evaluate), nor does Marks
appreciate the extent to which the FDA is subject to “high potential
for judicial review and public scrutiny”33 and thus subject to external
constraints as well.34
And, even if one (like Marks) tends toward inherent skepticism
regarding the FDA’s AI use and administrative law constraints, an
equally plausible interpretation of the PHASE/kratom incident is that
then-Commissioner Gottlieb’s preexisting hostility toward kratom led
to a seemingly inevitable political outcome.35 In other words, the
PHASE/kratom saga fits an overarching story about the role of politics
in regulatory policy and the influence of industry in agency
decisionmaking and accountability—not having anything in particular
to do with the FDA’s use of AI.

32. See Marks, supra note 5, at 1233–36 (explaining that HHS instructed DEA not to
schedule kratom because it did not find FDA’s PHASE predictions conclusive and assessed that
prohibiting the drug could prompt detrimental public health consequences from millions of users
potentially switching to lethal opioids as alternative painkillers).
33. Nitisha Baronia, David Freeman Engstrom, Daniel E. Ho, Shawn Musgrave &
Catherine M. Sharkey, Building Internal Capacity, in GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM:
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 74 (Feb. 2020)
[hereinafter Building Internal AI Capacity].
34. Administrative law offers more agency-constraining tools than Marks lets on. Should
the FDA actually use PHASE to decide not to approve a drug, a manufacturer could mount a
challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that FDA failed to consider
methodological flaws of PHASE or that the FDA’s conclusion is implausible given that it used
PHASE to reach it. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018). Agency rules are arbitrary, capricious, and
in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) “if the agency failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an implausible explanation that runs counter to the evidence before it, or relied
on factors that Congress did not intend.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Marks does not consider the extent to which external
constraints from administrative law doctrine can require the FDA to use reasoned
decisionmaking, thus enhancing credibility and public trust in its decisions.
35. To take perhaps the most obvious example (not mentioned by Marks), consider the
DEA’s scheduling of marijuana as a Schedule I drug (defined by the DEA as those with “no
currently accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse”). See Drug Scheduling, U.S. DRUG
ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/drug-information/drug-scheduling [https://perma.cc/V9ZFMEMN], (last visited Nov. 4, 2022). President Biden recently released a statement calling on the
Secretary of HHS to review marijuana’s scheduling classification. See President Joe Biden,
Statement
from
President
Biden
on
Marijuana
Reform
(Oct.
6,
2022),
https:/www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/06/statement-from-presidentbiden-on-marijuana-reform [https://perma.cc/NHT8-SU5K]. Marks’ silence on the racial and
societal implications of drug scheduling is surprising.
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But, given that readers can evaluate for themselves the
persuasiveness of Marks’ case studies, more worrisome to us are
Marks’ sins of omission. We fill out the picture here by drawing
attention to additional internal AI-use pilots conducted by the FDA
that show great promise. The FDA has used AI-enabled models to
mine data in order to assist with its postmarket surveillance targeting
of drug safety issues and to uncover new relationships between drugs
and medical conditions. The FDA’s Adverse Event Reporting System
(FAERS) database contains “adverse event reports, medication error
reports and product quality complaints resulting in adverse events that
were submitted to FDA.”36 These millions of reports and complaints
are in freeform text-based format.
In one pilot, with the goal of using AI technology to identify
postmarket safety concerns so as to prioritize safety review by FDA
subject matter experts, the FDA, in collaboration with Stanford
University data scientists, tested different NLP models to predict the
probability that FAERS reports contained policy-relevant information
about drug safety concerns.37 The FDA considered the pilot, which
identified six key features for priority review,38 “the foundation” of an
improved system that better allocates scarce agency resources in
identifying postmarket safety concerns.39 In another pilot, the FDA
used similar NLP techniques to translate FAERS’ unstructured data
into structured data before attempting to model relationships between
different drugs and hepatic failure, a medical condition affecting the
liver.40 For both pilots, the agency compared the performance of
multiple NLP models (such as neural network, logistic regression,
random forest, and support vector machine models) and optimized

36. Q&A on FAERS, supra note 9. The FDA received nearly 2.34 million FAERS reports
in 2021. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA ADVERSE EVENTS REPORTING SYSTEM
(FAERS) PUBLIC DASHBOARD [hereinafter FAERS Dashboard], https://fis.fda.gov/sense/
app/95239e26-e0be-42d9-a960-9a5f7f1c25ee/sheet/7a47a261-d58b-4203-a8aa-6d3021737452/state/analysis
[https://perma.cc/2MJJ-9RNN].
37. The FDA-Stanford team trained their models on drug reports from the World Health
Organization-Uppsala Monitoring Centre (WHO-UMC) manually labeled by FDA safety
evaluators for drug causality assessment. See Sharkey, Regulatory Analysis at the FDA, supra note
4, at 55.
38. See id. at 56.
39. Id.
40. This second pilot proved less successful than the FDA-Stanford pilot to prioritize
FAERS review, as it failed to confirm or disprove that the drugs involved in the FAERS reports
had a causal relationship to hepatic failure and did not generate outputs accurate enough for
deployment. Id.
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model parameters until it reached satisfying predictive power, in some
cases above 90 percent.41
Marks’ dismissive characterization (in a footnote reference) that
“the FDA concluded [the FAERS pilots] were unsuccessful” is thus
misleading (at best).42 Marks’ sole reference to FAERS is in his
scholarship review, in which he cites the 2020 Government by
Algorithm Report.43 But, the report uses far more positive qualified
language—namely that “the FDA’s FAERS efforts have been
successful, to an extent.”44
Moreover, the FDA fully recognizes that its experimentation with
AI in this domain is an iterative, trial-by-error long-term approach. In
2020, the FDA engaged the public in a “precisionFDA challenge” to
develop improved models for analyzing unstructured data from
FAERS reports. precisionFDA challenges involve the public in solving
technical challenges faced by the FDA in the domains of AI and
bioinformatics. Public participation in such “community-sourced
science” challenges helps bolster the transparency, accountability,
objectivity, and legitimacy of the new AI methods used by FDA.45 AI
innovation is a particularly apt area for involving the public given the
low startup costs of setting up computing-based challenges (as opposed
to wet-lab scientific challenges). The “Gaining New Insights by
Detecting Adverse Event Anomalies Using FDA Open Data”
challenge, which started in early 2020, asked participants to develop
AI/ML models to better detect “possible safety issues” from FDA’s
FAERS records.46 Since then, the agency has expanded its use of NLP

41. The hepatic failure pilot achieved a true positive rate of 91 percent and false positive
rate of 4.9 percent. Id. at 55. The review prioritization pilot did not achieve such high predictive
performance (area under the curve of 0.66) but still provided actionable results to accurately
prioritize human review. Id. at 55 & n.47.
42. See Marks, supra note 5, at 1213 n.30.
43. Id.
44. Sharkey, Regulatory Analysis at the FDA, supra note 4, at 56.
45. Challenges, PRECISIONFDA [hereinafter precisionFDA Challenges], https://precision.fda.gov/
challenges [https://perma.cc/83E3-BV3U].
46. See Gaining New Insights by Detecting Adverse Event Anomalies Using FDA Open Data,
precisionFDA [hereinafter FAERS precisionFDA Challenge], https://precision.fda.gov/
challenges/9 [https://perma.cc/ZC8A-QKRL]. The challenge suggested that participants rely on
NLP to extract relevant data features from the “text narrative portion of the adverse event
reports,” including basic information such as “symptoms, diagnosis, treatments, and dates.” Id.
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on unstructured text data to more data sources47 and to cutting-edge
“deep learning” language models.48
In addition to its investment in NLP technologies, the FDA has
launched initiatives to restructure its data operations and reshape its
technical data infrastructure, such as INFORMED (Information
Exchanged and Data Transformation), which tasked entrepreneurs-inresidence, engineers, and data scientists with medical subject-matter
expertise to strategize how the FDA should invest in big data analytics
capabilities.49
II. A REGULATORY PARADIGM SHIFT AT THE FDA: FROM
PREMARKET APPROVAL TO POSTMARKET SURVEILLANCE
The AI technological innovations for mining big data at the FDA
will likely drive a paradigm shift at the agency—from heavy investment
of resources and efforts focused on stringent ex ante premarket
approval to more dynamic and rigorous postmarket surveillance.
Marks, too, has recognized the significance of this paradigm shift. But,
whereas Marks emphasizes the potential perils from this shift, we point
to the promise not only in conventional terms of fostering innovation
but also in more novel terms of enabling more effective institutional
collaboration and regulatory enforcement in an AI-enabled

47. See A. Sorbello, R. Hasan, H. Francis, I. Chang, M. Ahadpour, M. Laponsky, J. Walsh
& C. Trier, A Novel Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning Classifier That
Streamlines Extracting Drug-Adverse Event Data from Literature Reports, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/media/142029/download [https://perma.cc/83JQ-4KB9] (summarizing
the FDA’s analysis of the PubMed/MEDLINE database, a leading scientific literature database
produced by the National Library of Medicine, to facilitate the identification of adverse drug
events).
48. See Yiwen Shi, Ping Ren, Yi Zhang, Xiajing Gong, Meng Hu & Hualou Liang,
Information Extraction from FDA Drug Labeling to Enhance Product-Specific Guidance
Assessment Using Natural Language Processing, 6 FRONTIERS RSCH. METRICS & ANALYTICS 1,
1 (2021), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frma.2021.670006/full [https://perma.cc/EXE9-2FSG]
(using large language “transformer” model called BERT (Bidirectional Encoder Representations
from Transformers) to extract information from regulatory text and help the development of
product-specific guidances); Yue Wu, Zhichao Liu, Leihong Wu, Minjun Chen & Weida Tong,
BERT-Based Natural Language Processing of Drug Labeling Documents: A Case Study for
Classifying Drug-Induced Liver Injury Risk, 4 FRONTIERS A.I. 1, 10 (2021),
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frai.2021.729834/full [https://perma.cc/X92W-ZZBF]
(using similar BERT models to classify risks of hepatic failures created by different drugs).
49. See Sean Khozin, Richard Padzur & Anand Shah, INFORMED: An Incubator at the US
FDA for Driving Innovation in Data Science and Agile Technology, 17 NATURE REVS. DRUG
DISCOVERY 529, 530 (2018) (“Our current objectives are twofold: first, to continue to expand and
maintain organizational and technical infrastructure for data science and big data analytics; and
second, to support systems thinking in oncology regulatory science research, [and develop] novel
solutions for improving efficiency, reliability and productivity in related workflows.”).
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postmarket surveillance regime. Chief among these benefits are (1) AI
increasing the speed at which FDA investigatory and corrective action
can take place and (2) the public benefit of heightened product and
manufacturing quality arising from firms being induced to have sound
algorithmic monitoring systems in place.
A. Describing the Shift
1. The FDA’s traditional paradigm. The FDA historically has
operated as a strict ex ante regulator. The FDA’s traditional regulatory
framework imposes heightened ex ante premarket approval for both
drugs and medical devices with relatively limited postmarket
surveillance. The core of the premarket approval process for brandname prescription drugs is the New Drug Application (NDA) process,
which requires manufacturers to conduct three phases of premarket
clinical trials to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of their drugs to
the FDA’s satisfaction.50 A similarly stringent Premarket Approval
(PMA) process applies to Class III (high risk) medical devices.51 The
FDA emerges as the most stringent ex ante safety regulator of any U.S.
federal agency; moreover, its “gold standard” is higher than that of
foreign medical product regulatory agencies.52
Under this traditional model, the FDA acts as a centralized federal
safety gatekeeper for prescription medical devices and drugs.53
50. See, e.g., The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/
Consumers/ucm143534.htm [https://perma.cc/NXL8-G3LN].
51. See Premarket Approval (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
medical-devices/premarket-submissions-selecting-and-preparing-correct-submission/premarketapproval-pma [https://perma.cc/9M5U-NCJU] (stating that “PMA is the most stringent type of
device marketing application required by FDA” because the “FDA has determined that general
and special controls alone are insufficient to assure the safety and effectiveness of Class III
devices”); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 317–18 (2008) (noting that PMA is a “rigorous”
process requiring a “multivolume application” and that “[t]he FDA spends an average of 1,200
hours reviewing each application”).
52. Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First?: Hearings Before the Senate Committee
On Finance, 108th Cong., at 1 (2004) (statement of Sandra L. Kweder, Deputy Dir., FDA Off. of
New Drugs) (“It is well recognized that FDA’s drug review is a gold standard. Indeed, we believe
that FDA maintains the highest worldwide standards for drug approval.”).
53. This regulatory framework is largely federalized, with important swaths of federal
preemption limiting the role of state law in promoting medical device and drug safety. See
generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 464–66, 474 (2008) (describing the “pro-preemption” trend of U.S.
Supreme Court cases); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330 (holding that state tort laws seeking to add design
or labeling requirements on top of the FDA’s rigorous premarket approval scheme for medical
devices were preempted); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 626 (2011) (holding that state
law failure-to-warn claims against generic drug manufacturers were preempted).

2022] AI AND THE REGULATORY SHIFT AT THE FDA

99

Historically, the FDA has focused great attention on minimizing “Type
I” errors—“false positives” or approval of drugs that turn out to have
safety issues—at the expense of increasing corresponding “Type II”
errors—“false negatives” or delaying or withholding drugs from the
market that, in fact, would provide net safety benefits to patients.54
Indeed, some have argued that, by doing so, the FDA has built up
tremendous reputational capital.55 It is precisely this institutional
reputational capital that Marks fears the FDA has been eroding in
recent times.56
Still, clinical trials—despite the FDA requiring three phases—
nonetheless only provide information from a relatively limited
population (even Phase III trials can be conducted with 1,000
participants) over a relatively brief period.57 We should, therefore, be
cognizant of their potential to mask serious safety risks and at least
remain open to the possibility that AI-enabled simulated clinical trials
might improve safety outcomes.
The stakes are particularly high for minority and marginalized
communities due not only to their relatively small sample sizes but also
selection bias in recruiting study participants for clinical trials.58 Marks

54. See, e.g., Andrew Flowers, How the FDA Could Change The Way It Approves Drugs,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 3, 2015, 12:34 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-the-fdacould-change-the-way-it-approves-drugs [https://perma.cc/4K3D-CZ57] (presenting research
criticizing the FDA’s focus on minimizing Type I error and arguing for higher false positive
tolerance for severe diseases “to allow more drugs to hit the market even though some of them
would be ineffective or harmful”); Jack Botting, The History of Thalidomide, 15 DRUG NEWS &
PERSPS. 604, 604 (2002) (explaining that the FDA strengthened its drug premarket approval
process following the thalidomide “disaster,” where a sedative drug initially thought to be
nontoxic caused an epidemic of deformities in children whose mothers had taken the drug while
pregnant). For a corresponding analysis of the Type I versus Type II trade-off in the device
approval realm, see Thomas J. Hwang, Elisaveta Sokolov, Jessica M. Franklin, & Aaron S.
Kesselheim, Comparison of Rates of Safety Issues and Reporting of Trial Outcomes for Medical
Devices Approved in the European Union and United States: Cohort Study, 353 BMJ 1, 1–7 (2016).
55. See generally DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL
IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010) (summarizing a large-scale
theoretical, historical, and statistical analysis of FDA pharmaceutical regulation (the FDA
Project) and concluding that the FDA’s organizational reputation has been the primary source of
its power).
56. See Marks, supra note 5, at 1260 (stating that the FDA’s reputation has been “under
fire” and warning that substituting algorithmic models for clinical trials may further erode its
reputation).
57. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michael D. Greene & Jerry Avorn, Who is Now Responsible
for Discovering and Warning About Adverse Effects of Generic Drugs?, 310 JAMA 1023, 1023
(2013) (recognizing that “premarket testing does not reveal the full range of a drug’s adverse
effects”).
58. See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Statins and Adverse Cardiovascular Events
in Moderate-Risk Females: A Statistical and Legal Analysis with Implications for FDA Preemption
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is right to raise a cautionary flag—if not attended to, the use of AI
could exacerbate biases against marginalized communities.59 But,
Marks understates the benefits of simulated trials, which can act as a
complement (as opposed to replacement) to randomized controlled
trials and allow trials to be run repeatedly or to reduce racial equity
risks inherent in unrepresentative clinical trials.60 Scientists conducting
simulated trials can intentionally and proactively build
representativeness into the virtual cohorts interacting with their
models. Moreover, one might take a more sanguine view after
examining how the FDA has been particularly attuned, as part of its
Model-Informed Drug Development (MIDD) initiative, to leverage
AI-based models “to bridge efficacy and safety for certain unstudied
patient subpopulations or use scenarios”61 with the goal of making
clinical trial data not only more efficient to collect but also “more
representative of diverse patient populations.”62 In one promising
study in May 2022, a team of pharmaceutical researchers, taking up the
MIDD challenge, confirmed the efficacy of an influenza drug on ethnic
groups that were underrepresented in the drug’s Phase III clinical
studies.63
In addition to the high costs and potential unrepresentativeness of
the FDA’s existing pre-market approval regime, such a stringent ex
Claims, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 507, 509–10 (2008) (explaining that the top-selling drug
Lipitor was approved by the FDA although its clinical trials included few women and generated
“inconclusive” drug efficacy results for women); Bassel Nazha, Manoj Mishra, Rebecca Pentz &
Taofeek K. Owonikoko, Enrollment of Racial Minorities in Clinical Trials: Old Problem Assumes
New Urgency in the Age of Immunotherapy, 39 AM. SOC’Y CLINICAL ONCOLOGY EDUC. BOOK
3, 4 (2019) (reporting that non-white participants represent only 20 percent of cancer clinical trial
participants).
59. See Marks, supra note 5, at 1273–76.
60. As Marks himself seems to recognize—by referring to models predicting rituximab as a
superior treatment to rheumatoid arthritis—simulated trials can also help drug manufacturers
decide whether running a clinical trial is worth the risks and costs. See id. at 1243.
61. See CDER Conversation: Model Informed Drug Development, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/news-events-human-drugs/cder-conversation-model-informed-drugdevelopment https://perma.cc/KD44-VGCG], (last updated June 12, 2018).
62. FDA’s Technology Modernization Action Plan (TMAP), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
2 (Sept. 18, 2019) [hereinafter TMAP], https://www.fda.gov/media/130883/download
[https://perma.cc/JFQ6-UC6W].
63. Sylvie Retout, Stefan De Buck, Sébastien Jolivet, Vincent Duval & Valérie Cosson, A
Pharmacokinetics–Time to Alleviation of Symptoms Model to Support Extrapolation of Baloxavir
Marboxil Clinical Efficacy in Different Ethnic Groups with Influenza A or B, 112 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 372, 373, 380 (2022); Piet H. van der Graaf, Diversity in
Clinical Pharmacology Coming of Age, 112 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 191,
192 (2022) (stating that Retout and co-workers’ success in using MIDD to support new drug
applications in different ethnic patient groups demonstrates the potential of MIDD for drug
development).
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ante regulatory approach undeniably delays time to market for
innovative drug and medical device products.64 To date, the FDA has
faced perhaps a Faustian dilemma with regard to tradeoffs between
Type I and Type II errors, namely the impossibility of reducing one
without increasing the other. Even its most adamant critics have
acknowledged that, should the FDA lower its stringent premarket
criteria, increased resources should be dedicated to postmarket
surveillance.65 While the FDA has been gradually expanding its
postmarket surveillance regime over the last fifteen years, the AI
revolution promises a more transformative shift.

2. A shift, accelerated by AI, to postmarket surveillance. The
development of AI technologies has propelled the FDA’s
transformative shift toward increased postmarket surveillance. For the
past several years, the FDA has relaxed the stringency of its premarket
testing regime, in effect shifting resources from premarket to
postmarket scrutiny.66 In 2021, the FDA issued 74 percent of its new
drug approvals under an “expedited program” loosening premarket
requirements to speed drug commercialization, and 28 percent of
approved drugs were approved through the Accelerated Approval
program, one type of “expedited program” that enables earlier drug
approval by relying on postmarket trials to confirm clinical efficacy.67
Back in 2007, responding to pleas by the FDA and legal scholars
urging the need for postmarket surveillance of drugs, Congress enacted
the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA).68
64. Note the difficulty in measuring these Type II errors, which are not as salient as Type I
errors. For some attempts to measure Type II errors in drug approvals, see generally Thomas J.
Philipson & Eric Sun, Cost of Caution: The Impact on Patients of Delayed Drug Approvals,
PROJECT FDA REPORT (June 2010).
65. See Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: Lessons from
Vioxx and Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 741, 747–48 (2005) (arguing for a
shift from premarket drug scrutiny by FDA to postmarket surveillance).
66. See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, Digital Health & Regulatory Experimentation at the FDA, 18
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, LAW & ETHICS 4, 14 (2019) (describing the FDA’s “shifting its focus
from pre-market to post-market evidence gathering” as a significant experiment in medical
product regulation); see also W. Nicholson Price III, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH.
L. REV. 421, 458 (2017) (advocating an approach for “black-box medicine” that would “combine
more moderate up-front regulation—graded by risk but with lower barriers than the full
premarket approval pathway—with robust postmarket surveillance to monitor the performance
of algorithms in real-world settings”).
67. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RSCH., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Advancing
Health Through Innovation: New Drug Therapy Approvals 2021, at 18 (Jan. 2022) [hereinafter
Advancing Health Through Innovation].
68. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REPORT TO REQUESTERS: DRUG
SAFETY, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA’S POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND
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The FDAAA granted the FDA authority to monitor safety risks from
already approved drugs and require drug manufacturers to perform
postmarket safety studies.69 Concerns have been raised since then
(including by Marks70) about the FDA’s track record of postmarket
surveillance.71 We recognize that it will likely take increased financial
resources along with institutional commitment for the FDA to up its
postmarket surveillance game.
But, notwithstanding the FDA’s constrained resources,72 we see
promise in the FDA’s ability to harness AI-enabled tools (with the
FAERS pilots being an early example) to improve the agency’s ability
to evaluate postmarket data at scale.73 Since the late 2000s, the FDA
has amassed large amounts of data, almost exclusively from
manufacturers, into adverse event reports databases (including
FAERS) to inform its postmarket surveillance efforts.74 The FDA has
OVERSIGHT PROCESS (2006); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting
Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 3, 41–44 (2017) (describing the
development of the FDA’s postmarket surveillance authority).
69. See Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
841, 863–64 (2008) (“Congress, after conducting numerous hearings . . . , has taken recent action
to buttress the FDA’s drug approval and oversight functions. The FDA Amendments
Act . . . empowers the FDA with additional authority during the postapproval period to monitor
drug side effects and to impose larger fines on companies that do not conduct postmarketing
studies.”).
70. See Marks, supra note 5, at 1216–17.
71. See, e.g., Daniel Carpenter, Reputation, Gatekeeping and the Politics of Post-Marketing
Drug Regulation, 8 ETHICS J. AM. MED. ASS’N 403, 404 (2006) (arguing that the FDA has
struggled to ensure compliance postmarket because the agency’s power over manufacturers
decreases once a drug or device is approved); Sheila Kaplan, FDA Faulted for Failure to Track
Safety Issues with Drugs Already on Market, STATNEWS (Jan. 14, 2016),
https://www.statnews.com/2016/01/14/fda-postmarket-study-report [https://perma.cc/6XR3-FNGS]
(noting that safety concerns arise after a drug goes on the market); Kesselheim et al., supra note
57, at 1023 (asserting that “post-market surveillance by the [FDA] is insufficient”); see also
Prashant V. Rajan, Daniel B. Kramer & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Medical Device Postapproval
Safety Monitoring Where Does the United States Stand?, 8 CIRCULATION: CARDIOVASCULAR
QUALITY OUTCOMES 1, 3 (2015) (finding that “many of the [adverse event] reports” on which
the FDA bases its postmarket surveillance “have flaws”).
72. As the U.S. Supreme Court remarked: “The FDA has limited resources to monitor the
11,000 drugs on the market, and manufacturers have superior access to information about their
drugs, especially in the postmarketing phase as new risks emerge.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555,
578–79 (2009).
73. See supra Part I.B.
74. The FDA started accepting electronic FAERS report submission in 2000 (though some
of the data in FAERS date back to 1968), and the volume of received reports started increasing
exponentially since around 2009. See FAERS Dashboard, supra note 36 (showing 107 reports for
1968, followed by a slow increase to tens of thousands in the 70s and 80s and hundreds of
thousands in the 90s and 2000s, before an exponential increase from 490,412 in 2009 to 2.34 million
in 2021). Manufacturers submit 95 percent of FAERS reports to fulfill FDA reporting
requirements, whereas patients, caregivers, and healthcare professionals voluntarily submit the
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used its postmarket analyses of adverse event reports data to update
regulatory rulemaking and guidance.75 On rare occasions, it even has
relied on postmarket insights to reevaluate premarket approval
decisions.76
Since incorporating AI into its postmarket surveillance regime,
the FDA has announced notable progress on processing its backlog of
postmarket surveillance analyses.77 After focusing exclusively on
premarket testing for most of its history, the FDA has made
postmarket surveillance an increasing priority over the past fifteen
years and now recognizes such ongoing review as a “critical part of the
FDA’s responsibilities.”78 While using NLP models to analyze FAERS
data has been the FDA’s principal foray into postmarket surveillance
to date, this postmarket shift can expand to more data sources and
leverage additional AI technologies.79
remaining 5 percent. See Anne Tobenkin, An Introduction to Drug Safety Surveillance and FDA
Adverse Event Reporting System, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 24 (Apr. 10, 2018),
http://www.learning.proclinical.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/PV-DDI-Webinar-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H88P-W53R].
75. See CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGY HEALTH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
INFUSION PUMP IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (Apr. 2010), https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/infusion-pumps/white-paper-infusion-pump-improvement-initiative
[https://perma.cc/33QR-QVX5] (describing how the FDA used its adverse event reports analyses
to refine its regulation of infusion pumps).
76. See Sharkey, Regulatory Analysis at the FDA, supra note 4, at 53.
77. See SCOTT GOTTLIEB, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STATEMENT BY FDA COMM’R
SCOTT GOTTLIEB, M.D., ON THE FDA’S EFFORTS TO HOLD INDUSTRY ACCOUNTABLE FOR
FULFILLING CRITICAL POST-MARKETING STUDIES OF THE BENEFITS, SAFETY OF NEW DRUGS
(Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-scottgottlieb-md-fdas-efforts-hold-industry-accountable-fulfilling [https://perma.cc/NW8W-3MAR]
(stating that, as of 2018, 76 and 81 percent of the FDA’s “post-marketing requirements” and
“post-marketing commitments,” two types of post-approval studies, were respectively progressing
on schedule).
78. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., The Public’s Stake in Adverse Event Reporting,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/questions-and-answers-fdas-adverse-event-reporting-system-faers/
publics-stake-adverse-event-reporting [https://perma.cc/HY47-HM68] (presenting postmarket drug
and device safety monitoring as a “critical part of FDA’s responsibilities”). Especially with regard
to medical devices, the FDA has explored ways to lower premarket barriers while ratcheting up
postmarket scrutiny. See generally, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEVELOPING A SOFTWARE
PRECERTIFICATION PROGRAM: A WORKING MODEL (2019), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/
MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/DigitalHealthPreCertProgram/UCM629276.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9Y6AVNA].
79. The FDA has created additional adverse event reporting databases, including the
Sentinel Database (for drugs, vaccines, biologics, and medical devices), the Manufacture and User
Facility Device Experience (MAUDE) database (for medical devices), and the Tobacco Product
Problem database (for tobacco products). See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA’s Sentinel
Initiative, https://www.fda.gov/safety/fdas-sentinel-initiative [https://perma.cc/R4UE-AGM6];
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience, OPENFDA,
https://open.fda.gov/data/maude [https://perma.cc/6NSW-MQFX]; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
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B. Evaluating the Shift
As an initial matter, as the FDA confronts regulating a new
generation of AI medical devices that incorporate dynamic AI, this
shift to postmarket surveillance becomes a practical necessity. The
FDA’s regulatory guidance regarding novel medical AI devices
emphasizes the need for postmarket monitoring of AI models.80
Postmarket monitoring is accordingly one of the key principles for the
FDA’s “Good Machine Learning Practice for Medical Device
Development” (co-published with Canadian and U.K. health safety
regulators in October 2021).81
Moreover, the FDA’s increase in postmarket surveillance opens
up the possibility for more streamlined, less stringent premarket safety
review—holding overall safety constant (or even improving it overall).
For example, in the realm of regulating AI powered software-based
medical devices, the FDA is experimenting with developing a more
streamlined premarket review, coupled with ongoing heightened
postmarket surveillance.82 It is in this vein that we must evaluate
Marks’ concern that the FDA’s relaxation of ex ante requirements for
premarket clinical trial studies to allow AI-driven simulation models
might lead to “erroneous conclusions” (i.e., Type I errors) in drug
approval.83 We, too, might readily agree if viewed in isolation, but

Tobacco Product Problem Reports, https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/tobacco-scienceresearch/tobacco-product-problem-reports [https://perma.cc/4XRP-29RY].
80. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text; TMAP, supra note 62, at 3 (mentioning
the need to manage “workload both in the premarket and post-market space”).
81. Good Machine Learning Practice for Medical Device Development: Guiding Principles,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/software-medical-device-samd/goodmachine-learning-practice-medical-device-development-guiding-principles [https://perma.cc/5VLG-XQM2]
(listing as a guiding principle that “Deployed Models Are Monitored for Performance and Retraining Risks Are Managed”).
82. See Informing the FDA’s Digital Health Pre-Cert Program, PRESIDENTIAL INNOVATION
FELLOWS: PROJECTS, https://presidentialinnovationfellows.gov/projects/fda-precert [https://perma.cc/
DML5-EWSP] (describing project by FDA to “streamline[]” the premarket review of softwarebased medical devices developed by trusted manufacturers who “are committed to [postmarket]
monitoring [of the] real-world performance of their products”). The FDA’s use of AI-powered
postmarket surveillance thus will equip it to match the iterative improvement framework
implemented by dynamically updating AI/ML-based software. See SAMD PLAN, supra note 26,
at 1 (“This framework would enable FDA to provide a reasonable assurance of safety and
effectiveness while embracing the iterative improvement power of artificial intelligence and
machine learning-based software as a medical device.”).
83. Marks, supra note 5, at 1223 (“[A]dopting [computer] models [for drug approval] hastily
or haphazardly can produce erroneous conclusions. . . . [M]any existing and proposed algorithmic
models have not been rigorously evaluated, and their credibility is unknown. Others have known
deficiencies that negatively affect their credibility.”).
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surely such risks are mitigated in a context in which the FDA also
simultaneously boosts its postmarket surveillance regime.
Our point here is, at least, to consider the extent to which the
reduction of premarket regulatory requirements can thereby lower
Type II errors—fostering innovation and minimizing delay to
market—without sacrificing overall safety (or Type I errors) by
increasing postmarket surveillance. The FDA is experimenting with
the collection and evaluation of “real-world evidence” in the
postmarket surveillance period to uncover risk evidence that inevitably
may be missed from clinical trials or other premarket testing
procedures.84 The FDA has launched multiple projects to collect realworld data, such as the National Evaluation System for health
Technology (NEST), which was designed to “help improve the quality
of real-world evidence that FDA can use to detect emerging safety
signals quickly and take appropriate actions,”85 and the
MyStudiesApp, which was built to “foster the collection of real world
evidence via patients’ mobile devices” with the goal of helping
manufacturers in their design of new health care solutions while
complying with “the FDA’s regulations and guidance for data
authenticity, integrity and confidentiality.”86 By leveraging such “real
world evidence,” the FDA “may be able to provide patients and
providers with important answers much sooner by potentially
identifying a broader range of safety signals more quickly.”87
III. REALIZING THE PROMISE OF AI AT THE FDA
We recognize the tentative nature of our rebuttal to Marks’
doomsday predictions. In our minds, the key to the FDA’s realizing the

84. See TMAP, supra note 62, at 2 (“FDA is building the scientific and policy infrastructure
to support increasing use of real-world evidence to support regulatory decisions. The 21st Century
Cures Act, enacted in 2016, highlighted the importance of real-world evidence in the context of
drug development.”); supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (emphasizing that clinical trials
inevitably mask or fail to uncover drug risks).
85. Medical Device Safety Action Plan: Protecting Patients, Promotion Public Health, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 10 (2018), https://www.fda.gov/media/112497/download [https://perma.cc/UP5X5UK7].
86. FDA Launches New Digital Tool to Help Capture Real World Data from Patients to Help
Inform Regulatory Decision-Making, U.S. Food & Drug. Admin. (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-brief/fda-brief-fda-launches-new-digital-tool-help-capturereal-world-data-patients-help-inform-regulatory [https://perma.cc/4LPF-2GHT].
87. Scott Gottlieb, Remarks Before the Bipartisan Policy Center, Breaking Down Barriers
Between Clinical Trials and Clinical Care: Incorporating Real World Evidence into Regulatory
Decision Making, U.S. FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm629942.htm [https://perma.cc/3YC4-A62M].

106

DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[Vol. 72:86

promise of AI (and mitigating its perils) is the agency’s success at
building internal AI capacity.88 Armed with the strong AI-embedded
expertise that it has built over the past five years, the FDA has the
opportunity to become an AI-enabled “information agency” if it
restructures its data operations and adopts a technical data
infrastructure relying on “fit-for-purpose” data.
A. Building Internal AI Capacity at the FDA
Whereas federal agencies often lack the technical capability
necessary to regulate novel AI products or build AI tools in-house,89
the FDA emerges as an outlier agency that has invested significant
resources to develop internal AI capacity. More specifically (tracking
the guidelines articulated in the 2020 Government by Algorithm
Report), the FDA has: (1) “invest[ed] in [its] technical and data
infrastructure,” (2) “cultivate[d] in-house human capital to produce AI
tools that are not only usable at the technical level but also compliant
at the legal and policy levels,”90 and (3) “invest[ed] in comprehensive
and flexible AI strategies that allow [the] agenc[y] to learn strategically
from failures and evolve.”91
First and foremost, the FDA has invested in building human
capital expertise in AI. As a protector of public health, the FDA must
be prepared to respond to the health emergencies of the future using
tools and processes that meet the sophistication of the industry that the
FDA regulates. Starting in 2017, the FDA has recruited dozens of
technical hires, including engineers, AI experts, and “cloud computing
whizzes,” to help it adjust to the AI revolution.92 That same year, the

88. See Building Internal AI Capacity, supra note 33, at 71–74.
89. See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Procurement as Policy:
Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 781 (2019) (showing that
agencies “most often lack the technical expertise to design or assess algorithmic systems on their
own”).
90. Success stories at other agencies, such as the Social Security Administration (SSA), the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), illustrate
the need for agencies to have their staff with technical expertise collaborate with their staff with
regulatory subject matter expertise in order to implement AI tools effectively for regulatory
purposes. See Building Internal AI Capacity, supra note 33, at 71–73 & n.29–30 (showing that the
SSA’s success in building tools identifying potential errors in draft disability determinations
hinged on its ability to hire lawyers with both regulatory and technical skills, that the IRS built inhouse technical expertise to automate dynamic regulatory tasks, and that the SEC relied on
internal expertise to iteratively update its AI enforcement tools and prevent regulated entities
from gaming its violation detection models).
91. Id. at 71.
92. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

2022] AI AND THE REGULATORY SHIFT AT THE FDA

107

agency created an Entrepreneurs in Residence program.93 In 2021,
HHS—the FDA’s mother agency—appointed its first Chief AI
Officer.94 Among other initiatives, the Office of the Chief AI Officer
released an AI strategy and created a framework for developing
“trustworthy AI” within government.95
Leveraging this human capital with AI expertise, the FDA has
developed a flexible and iterative approach to regulating AI-based
medical products by experimenting with regulatory “sandboxes” and
building partnerships to complement its own internal AI capacity.96
Regulatory sandboxes present great advantages for regulating nascent
and quickly evolving technologies such as AI. They enable regulators
to “fail cheaply” and relatively safely,97 de-risk projects early, define
metrics to measure success, and iterate on their technical infrastructure
for regulatory analytics. The FDA has partnered with entrepreneurs
and private organizations to run its INFORMED program as a
regulatory sandbox focusing on AI-driven oncology innovation.
INFORMED created “a unique sandbox for networking, ideation and

93. See Digital Health Innovation Action Plan, U.S. FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN. 7 (2017),
https://www.fda.gov/media/106331/download [https://perma.cc/2QRR-2YMY].
94. See About the HHS Office of the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer (OCAIO), U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH HUMAN SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/asa/ocio/ai/ocaio/
index.html [https://perma.cc/LU9C-98S7], (last updated Mar. 4, 2022).
95. Artificial Intelligence (AI) Strategy, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH HUMAN SERVS. 3 (Jan. 2021),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hhs-ai-strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/R644-HFXV] (presenting HHS’s
AI strategy); Trustworthy AI (TAI) Playbook, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH HUMAN SERVS. 7 (Sept. 2021),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hhs-trustworthy-ai-playbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4QA-BV8S]
(presenting HHS’s “trustworthy AI” framework). The FDA’s growing internal AI capacity could
strengthen the agency’s “innovation role” for AI products, with HHS’s Office of the Chief AI
Officer essentially serving as an innovation internal coordinator. Cf. Rachel E. Sachs, W.
Nicholson Price II & Patricia J. Zettler, Rethinking Innovation at FDA (forthcoming) (manuscript
at 8) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (analyzing “the ways that FDA makes decisions and
judgments that shape what products, or new uses of products, are developed (or are believed to
be developed) in the future”).
96. In its 2019 Technology Modernization Action Plan (TMAP), the FDA emphasized its
strategy of adopting a flexible approach combining internal capacity building, collaboration with
industry and other government agencies, or purchasing off-the-self solutions:
“For some projects, FDA will perform the role of a traditional technology developer:
seeking and taking a leading role in the technological modernization of our regulatory
review system as well as the underlying infrastructure that supports it. . . . Other
solutions will be catalyzed by FDA but otherwise built within the larger biomedicine
ecosystem, including through collaboration with other government agencies. FDA will
also continue to review the overall technology marketplace for new fit-for-purpose offthe-shelf solutions that can be efficiently adopted into the FDA environment.”
See TMAP, supra note 62, at 6.
97. The FDA, however, must preserve a low risk tolerance even in such regulatory sandbox
initiatives, given the potential public health consequences from any mistake in drug or medical
device safety regulation.
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sharing of technical and organizational resources, empowering project
teams with the tools needed to succeed in developing novel data
science solutions.”98 Perhaps even Marks would support such AI
“sandboxes,” which allow the FDA to take the necessary steps to
develop stronger independent AI tools without endangering public
safety.
With regard to partnerships, Marks raises a flag of caution with
regard to the FDA’s collaboration with industry partners.99 Here, we
agree that the FDA should take measures to ensure that it does not
become reliant on “black box” proprietary AI technologies built by
private companies, which could unduly favor these companies’
regulatory objectives. Agencies that rely on third-party developers to
build their AI tools take on a risk of allowing the regulated industry to
gain access to that same developer, thus potentially compromising their
tool. For this reason, the 2020 Government by Algorithm Report
strongly encourages agencies to develop their own internal expertise
on AI development and maintenance.100
The FDA has, moreover, built partnerships with other agencies
and engaged the public to augment its internal technical capacity. In
2016, the FDA started a partnership with the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), which has played an active role in
creating standards to evaluate the risk and “trustworthiness” levels of
AI tools.101 While Marks criticizes the FDA’s inattention to standardssetting in the realm of AI, he missed an opportunity to explore the
possibility that the FDA might draw from NIST’s AI Risk
Management Framework (which gets nary a mention by Marks).102

98. Khozin et al., supra note 49, at 530.
99. See Marks, supra note 5, at 1245 (warning against the conflict-of-interest dangers
inherent in the FDA’s reliance on clinical trial simulation technologies developed by industry
stakeholders to evaluate the safety and efficacy of their own products).
100. See Building Internal AI Capacity, supra note 33, at 71–74.
101. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce and the Food and Drug Administration, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/domestic-mous/mou-225-21-006
[https://perma.cc/S2T6-Y2YG] (stating that the FDA and NIST will “collaborate in
interdisciplinary research in . . . application of synthetic intelligence (e.g. neural networks,
AI/ML), and adaptive process control strategies”); AI Risk Management Framework, NAT’L INST.
OF STANDARDS AND TECH., https://www.nist.gov/itl/ai-risk-management-framework [https://perma.cc/
4H9V-RW2Q] (describing NIST’s work to “develop[] a framework to better manage
risks . . . associated with artificial intelligence”).
102. Instead, Marks looks to whether an industry framework developed by ASME’s
Verification & Validation 40 Committee could be adapted for FDA’s internal use, specifically to
the agency’s internal assessment of model credibility. See Marks, supra note 5, at 1264–66. Given
the V&V 40 model’s shortcomings (as rehearsed by Marks), it is all the more surprising that he
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Since 2014, the FDA has solicited input from outside AI experts
to help solve technical challenges by running open challenges through
its precisionFDA program, which provides “a secure, cloud-based
platform where participants can access and share datasets, analysis
pipelines, and bioinformatics tools, in order to benchmark their
approaches and advance regulatory science.”103 The FDA’s sustained
efforts in strengthening its internal capacity and engaging partners to
augment its expertise give us confidence in the agency’s ability to avoid
the dark path that Marks predicts.
The FDA faces perhaps its biggest future challenges to internal
capacity building with regard to buttressing the agency’s technical data
infrastructure. Although the FDA has launched initiatives to increase
the range of data available to its AI efforts—with a focus on “realworld” data104—the agency faces hurdles in turning “big” data into
“smart” data. Traditionally, the FDA has used a limited variety of data
submitted by manufacturers in randomized clinical trials. These data
involved small sample sizes, were collected intermittently, and were
stored in highly structured formats. In contrast, the FDA’s AI-enabled
postmarket surveillance plans will require the agency to collect data
from a variety of sources—including real-world data collected directly
from patients, in high volume, and on an ongoing basis.
B. AI and the Rise of the FDA as an “Information Agency”
The FDA has reached a significant fork in the road.105 With
FAERS and other postmarket databases, the FDA collects “big,” high
volume data on an ongoing basis.106 Will the FDA continue along its
traditional path of collecting continuous data streams in unstructured
formats, or will it instead chart an alternative path? In our view, the
way forward for the FDA to realize its full potential as an “information
agency” of the twenty-first century is to chart a new path, leveraging
did not consider the NIST framework, which has the added benefit of being developed
independently (and external to the FDA and the industry it regulates).
103. About precisionFDA, PRECISIONFDA, https://precision.fda.gov/about [https://perma.cc/
R88E-V7FL]. The FDA has run a total of eighteen challenges under their precisionFDA
program. precisionFDA Challenges, supra note 45.
104. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text (highlighting the FDA leadership’s focus
on collecting and analyzing real-world data).
105. The 2020 Government by Algorithm Report uncovered an internal split in potential
approaches for the future of regulatory AI at the FDA. See Sharkey, Regulatory Analysis at the
FDA, supra note 4, at 56 (“The FDA may be at a crossroads with respect to whether it continues
to use NLP to handle unstructured data, or whether it instead restructures its data collection.”).
106. In 2021, 2.34 million reports were submitted to FAERS. See FAERS Dashboard, supra
note 36.
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AI technologies using “fit for purpose” data, i.e., data whose content
and format are optimized for regulatory use. In order to leverage not
only “big” but also “smart” data, the FDA should restructure its data
collection protocols and collect structured “fit-for-purpose” data in the
first instance rather than building out NLP-based tools to extract
structured data from unstructured text, such as existing adverse event
reports.107
The FDA’s current data and AI approach to postmarket
surveillance regulatory analytics—relying solely on NLP models
applied to unstructured text data from databases such as FAERS—
raises concerns regarding causality analyses and data interoperability.
Although the FAERS pilots reached modest positive results from
prioritizing human review of postmarket adverse event reports and
uncovering new relationships between drugs and medical conditions,108
they have proved less successful when attempting to make causal
inferences based on unrepresentative data.109 AI-based predictive
analytics capabilities cannot substitute for conventional principles of
causal inference, and Marks is thus right to warn that careless reliance
on computer models could lead to flawed causation analysis.110 The
FDA’s current reliance on unstructured data exacerbates these causal
inference challenges. Whereas precision is critical in evaluating causal
relationships between drugs and adverse health conditions, the first
107. While the FDA has focused on NLP techniques, it also has considered adopting a data
infrastructure relying on “fit-for-purpose” data. See Enabling More Efficient and Seamless
Regulatory
Review
Processes,
PRESIDENTIAL
INNOVATION
FELLOWS,
https://presidentialinnovationfellows.gov/projects/fda-cio [https://perma.cc/HG4Z-J72Z] (listing
“shor[ing] up [FDA’s] critical data assets to quality and ‘fit for purpose’ data” as one of the five
challenges tackled by the project); Jacqueline Corrigan-Curay, The FDA Real-World Evidence
(RWE) Framework and Considerations for Use in Regulatory Decision-Making, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. 11 (May 12, 2021) https://www.fda.gov/media/148543/download [https://perma.cc/
8HT9-48AS] (mentioning a project to “[d]evelop[] a Reusable Framework for transforming raw
data in fit-for-purpose data”). NLP could still be used on top of fit-for-purpose data to perform
predictive or causality analyses and would operate on “clean,” standardized, and directly
actionable data, instead of “messy,” freeform unstructured text data requiring pre-processing.
108. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text.
109. FAERS submissions do not require demonstrating causation. See Tobenkin, supra note
74, at 25 (FAERS reports can be submitted “even if causality is uncertain”); Q&A on FAERS,
supra note 9 (“FDA does not require that a causal relationship between a product and event be
proven, and reports do not always contain enough detail to properly evaluate an event.”). FAERS
reports also suffer from quality (duplicate data), completeness (missing data), and reliability
(unverified data) issues. See Tobenkin, supra note 74, at 26 (“Quality of the reports is variable
and often incomplete; Duplicate reporting of the same case occurs.”); Q&A on FAERS, supra
note 9 (listing same issues).
110. See Marks, supra note 5, at 1243–44 (“[I]nstead of being surrogates for direct
observation of clinical effects, models and simulations are surrogates for evidence of causation.
Consequently, they may be even less reliable than traditional surrogates.”).
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step of translating unstructured data into actionable data labels (such
as drug name or medical condition) leaves much room for error. Not
surprisingly, then, the hepatic failure FAERS pilot fell short in terms
of uncovering causal relationships between drugs and hepatic failures
based on the available unstructured data.111 Relying on unstructured
data also poses significant challenges to data interoperability, as it is
difficult to “join” different data sources that contain unstructured
data.112
Training and using its AI models, instead, on fit-for-purpose data
would alleviate—if not fully resolve—these causal inference and
interoperability challenges. Structured data labels would make it easier
to verify and enforce data quality, completeness, and reliability.113 The
FDA has taken some preliminary steps in this direction. Its Technology
Modernization Action Plan emphasizes interoperability across
multiple data sources and between the FDA and external
stakeholders.114
The FDA has the means to transform most of the data it collects
to structured data. Ninety-five percent of FAERS reports come from
manufacturers on which the FDA could impose structured data
submission requirements.115 And, its Real World Data Enterprise
Proposal involved a $100 million budget to expand the volume and
variety of real-world data collected by the FDA to assist postmarket
monitoring.116 Despite a more significant investment required in the
short term, the “fit-for-purpose” data approach provides superior
prospects for powerful regulatory analytics use cases in the long term.
Moving further along this path, moreover, would strengthen the FDA’s
regulatory role as an “information agency” of the twenty-first century.
111. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
112. “Join” is a database operation performed to establish a connection between two or more
database tables based on matching columns, thereby creating a relationship between the tables.
113. Based on structured data, the FDA could run straightforward analyses to identify
duplicates and missing data and run quality assurance protocols to check for unexpected values.
114. See TMAP, supra note 62, at 4 (“FDA’s action plan [includes] communication and
collaboration between FDA and stakeholders, including the technology industry and other
government agencies, to drive technological progress that is interoperable across the system and
delivers value to consumers and patients.” (emphasis added)); id. at 7 (mentioning the benefits of
building “[c]lear technical interfaces for external stakeholders”); id. at 8 (“As FDA builds out
increasingly advanced technologies, FDA will work with external partners to build appropriate
application programming interfaces (APIs) and other tools to allow for the efficient submission
of high-quality data to FDA.”).
115. See Tobenkin, supra note 74, at 24.
116. Scott Gottlieb, FDA Budget Matters: A Cross-Cutting Data Enterprise for Real World
Evidence, U.S. FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN. (June 10, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fdavoices/fda-budget-matters-cross-cutting-data-enterprise-real-world-evidence [https://perma.cc/62RC-L5X5].
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CONCLUSION
AI holds huge promise for the administrative state—not just for
private industry. The question facing federal agencies is not whether,
but how and in which domains, to adopt AI for their regulatory
purposes. The FDA’s early engagement with AI could serve as a model
for other agencies. The agency has effectively built internal AI
capacity; proactively outlined a regulatory framework tailored to novel
AI medical devices featuring “dynamic AI”; and seen some moderate
success with its use of NLP to analyze postmarket FAERS adverse
safety event data.
The FDA’s accelerating transition to a robust postmarket
surveillance regime showcases the ability of AI technologies to
accelerate regulatory paradigm shifts. The FDA is poised to further
refine its data-driven regulatory approach to embrace “fit-forpurpose” data, thereby securing its transformation into an
“information agency” of the twenty-first century and providing a
window into the future promise of AI in the administrative state.

